Three decades ago, Montgomery introduced a new elliptic curve model for use in Lenstra's ECM factorization algorithm. Since then, his curves and the algorithms associated with them have become foundational in the implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems. This article surveys the theory and cryptographic applications of Montgomery curves over non-binary finite fields, including Montgomery's x-only arithmetic and Ladder algorithm, x-only Diffie-Hellman, y-coordinate recovery, and twodimensional and Euclidean differential addition chains such as Montgomery's PRAC algorithm.
Introduction
Peter L. Montgomery's landmark 1987 paper Speeding the Pollard and elliptic curve methods of factorization [38] introduced what became known as Montgomery curves and the Montgomery ladder as a way of accelerating Lenstra's ECM factorization method [33] . However, they have gone on to have a far broader impact: While remaining a crucial component of modern factoring software, they have also become central to elliptic curve cryptography. , then x is just P → x(P); in other models or coordinate systems, x may be more complicated. We call P 1 the x-line of E. Now, P 1 does not inherit any group structure from E. But since commutes with [k] (i.e., [k]( P) = [k]P), we still get an induced pseudomultiplication x(P) −→ x([k]P) on P 1 for every k in Z.
In his seminal article proposing elliptic curves for use in cryptography, Miller [37] pointed out that elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be expressed entirely in terms of the maps x(P) → x([k]P): Given a public base point x(P) on P 1 , Alice (resp. Bob) can compute and publish x([a]P) (resp. x([b]P)) for some secret a and b, and then derive the shared secret x([b][a]P) = x([a][b]P) from x([b]P) (resp. x([a]P)). We can always lift the resulting Diffie-Hellman problem to E, so E provides not only the map x, but also the security of the whole protocol, but by working in P 1 (F q ) instead of E(F q ), we can save some space and (hopefully) some time.
As a second application, consider ECM. We are given an integer N whose prime factorization is unknown. Choosing a random elliptic curve E over Z/N Z and constructing a point P in E(Z/N Z), we can compute [B!]P for some moderate bound B; if there exists a prime factor p of N such that #E(F p ) is B-smooth, then we will have [B!]P ≡ O (mod p), and we can detect this situation by taking the GCD of the projective Z -coordinate of [B!]P (for a Weierstrass model of E) with N . If the GCD is neither 1 nor N , then we have found a factor of N ; otherwise, we can try again with another random E. But all this still holds if we replace P with x(P) and [B!]P with x([B!]P), and the advantages of compactness and simplicity that we can see in Diffie-Hellman on P 1 are magnified in the ECM context, where the integer N can be much larger than any reasonable cryptographic q.
In both scenarios, our task is simple: We need to define a class of curves E equipped with efficient algorithms for computing x(P) → x([k]P) on P 1 .
Montgomery's work provides a brilliant answer to this problem. The Montgomery ladder is a simple yet efficient algorithm for computing x(P) → x([k]P). In the abstract, the ladder is a sequence of steps of pseudo-operations derived from the curve E (see Sect. 3.1); choosing a Montgomery curve for E ensures that each of those steps is optimized. The result, for Montgomery, was an extremely efficient implementation of ECM, and even today, three decades later, Montgomery's methods remain at the heart of state-of-the-art factoring software such as the widely distributed GMP-ECM package [24, 49] . Later, these same qualities also led to many efficient implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems, most notably Bernstein's Curve25519 software [3] .
Notation Throughout, we work over the finite field F q , where q is a power of an odd prime p (for most contemporary applications, q = p or p 2 ). We write M, S, a, and s for the cost of a single multiplication, squaring, addition, and subtraction in F q , respectively. We will occasionally need to multiply by some constant elements of F q , which we hope to make as cheap as possible: We write c for the cost of a single such multiplication, to help keep track of this cost separately from the other multiplications with two variable inputs. 
suffices to work in affine coordinates; optimized projective formulae will follow later in Sect. 3.
The point O at infinity acts as the zero element of the group structure; the negation map is : (x : y : 1) → (x : −y : 1). For addition, if P = (x P , y P ) and
if P = Q, then P ⊕ Q = O. We note that λ is the slope of the secant through P and Q (or the tangent to E (A,B) at P, in the case P = Q). As usual, we write E (A,B) (F q ) for the group of rational points of E (A,B) (i.e., projective solutions of (1)) with coordinates in F q . The m-torsion E[m] is the kernel of the scalar multiplication [m]. In general, its elements are defined over some extension of F q ; we write E[m](F q ) for the group of m-torsion elements whose coordinates are in F q .
Special torsion and group structures
What can we say about the group structure of E (A,B) (F q )?
We note immediately that E (A,B) always has a rational point of order two,
In projective coordinates, we can see one of the characteristic features of Montgomery curves more clearly. On any elliptic curve E with a point T of order 2, the translation-by-T map on E commutes with , so it induces an involution on the xline P 1 = E/ , which has the form (X : Z ) → (a X +bZ : cX +d Z). But for T = (0, 0) on a Montgomery curve E (A,B) , this involution is as simple as possible:
Montgomery notes in [38] , following Suyama, that the order of E (A,B) (F q ) is always divisible by 4. The nonsingularity condition requires B, A + 2, and A − 2 to be nonzero. If we let E (A,B ) be the quadratic twist of E (A,B) , then the following facts are easy to check:
is a square, then A 2 − 4 must be a square; then x 2 + Ax + 1 splits completely over F p , so E (A,B) has full rational 2-torsion. If α is one root of x 2 + Ax + 1, then the other root is 1/α; the points (α : 0 : 1) and (1 : 0 : α) have order 2 and are exchanged by τ T . There are also points of order two on E (A,B ) with exactly the same coordinates.
The key thing is that in any finite field, B(A+2), B(A−2), and A 2 − 4 cannot all be non-squares simultaneously: at least one of the above situations is forced to occur, and so #E (A,B) (F q ) is always divisible by 4. Table 1 summarizes the resulting group structures for various combinations of the three conditions. Going further, Suyama shows that if we take A = −(3a 4 + 6a 2 −1)/4a 3 and B = (a 2 −1) 2 /4ab 2 for some a and b in F q with ab(a 2 −1)(9a 2 −1) = 0, then (a, b) is a point of order 3 in E (A,B) (F q ). This is useful in ECM, where we want to produce curves whose reduction modulo p have smooth order; reducing a curve from Suyama's parameterization yields a curve whose order is divisible by 12, and hence more probably smooth than the order of a random curve.
For cryptographic constructions, we generally want #E (A,B) (F q ) to be as near prime as possible. A Montgomery curve over a finite field can never have prime order: We always have 4 | #E (A,B) (F q ) (and 4 | #E (A,B ) (F q )), so the best we can hope for is #E (A,B) (F q ) = 4r with r prime. Reassuringly, there is no theoretical obstruction to the existence of E (A,B) /F q such that #E (A,B) (F q ) = 4r with r prime, and indeed, in practice we have no trouble finding A and B in F q such that #E (A,B) (F q )/4 is prime.
Correspondence with short Weierstrass models
Any Montgomery curve over F q can be transformed into a short Weierstrass model over F q (assuming q is not a power of 3): for example, the rational maps (
define an isomorphism over F q between E (A,B) and the short Weierstrass model
The converse does not hold: Not every short Weierstrass model can be transformed into a Montgomery model over F q . This is obvious enough: Not every short Weierstrass model has a rational point of order 2 to map to T (and not every j-invariant in F q can be expressed in the form of (2) with A in F q ).
Still, it is useful to have a simple algebraic condition on the coefficients of a short Weierstrass model that encapsulate its transformability to Montgomery form. With this in mind, Okeya, Kurumatani, and Sakurai [41] observe that E W : v 2 = u 3 +au +b has a Montgomery model if and only if there exist α and β in F q such that α 3 + aα + b = 0 and 3α 2 + a = β 2 : We then have an isomorphism
The first relation ensures that there is a rational 2-torsion point (α, 0) in E W (F q ) (which is mapped to T = (0, 0) by the isomorphism); the second ensures that translation by the image of that point acts as in (3).
Correspondence with twisted Edwards models
The last decade has seen the great success of Edwards models for elliptic curves in cryptographic implementations (see, e.g., [7, 23] , and [5] ). It turns out that every Montgomery curve over F q is F q -isomorphic to a twisted Edwards model and vice versa [5, §3] . The rational maps
define an isomorphism between E (A,B) and the twisted Edwards model
The most natural projective closure for E Ed (a,d) is not in P 2 , but in P 1 × P 1 , which embeds into P 3 via the Segre morphism. Taking coordinates (U 0 :
; these are the extended Edwards coordinates of [29] .
is viewed as a curve in P 1 × P 1 , then x is just projection onto the second factor. The distinguished 2-torsion point T maps to (0, −1) = (1 : 0 : −1 : 0), and the translation τ T becomes d) . We can also consider the images of the other torsion points described in Sect. 2.3. The 2-torsion points 
Fast differential arithmetic in P 1
In projective coordinates, the quotient map x :
We emphasize that the formula x((X : Y : Z )) = (X : Z ) only holds on the open subset of E (A,B) where Z = 0; it does not extend to the point O = (0 : 1 : 0) at infinity, because (0 : 0) is not a projective point.
Pseudo-operations
Our first step toward computing x(P) → x([k]P) is to define efficient pseudo-group operations on P 1 derived from the group operation on E (A,B) . As we noted earlier, P 1 inherits no group structure from E (A,B) : In particular, there is no map (x(P), x(Q)) → x(P ⊕ Q). This is because x(P) determines P only up to sign, so while (x(P), x(Q)) mathematically determines the pair {x(P ⊕ Q), x(P Q)}, we cannot tell which of the values is the correct "sum." However, any three of the values {x(P), x(Q), x(P ⊕ Q), x(P Q))} determine the fourth, so we can define a pseudo-addition on P 1 by
The degenerate case where P = Q becomes a pseudodoubling
These two operations will be the basis of our efficient pseudomultiplications.
Our first task is to compute xADD and xDBL efficiently.
, with neither equal to T nor O (so in particular, x P and x Q are both nonzeros). Montgomery observed that if P = Q, then the x-coordinates of P, Q, P ⊕ Q, and P Q are related by
while in the case P = Q, writing
Analogous identities exist for general Weierstrass models, but they are much simpler for Montgomery curves-as we will see in Sect. 3.4. It is this simplicity, due to the special form of τ T discussed in Sect. 2.3, that leads to particularly efficient pseudo-operations for Montgomery curves.
Pseudo-addition
Our aim is to compute x(P ⊕ Q) in terms of x(P), x(Q), and x(P Q); we suppose P = Q and P Q = T . Following Montgomery [38, §10.3.1], we move to projective coordinates and write
Since P Q / ∈ {O, T }, we know that X = 0 and Z = 0. Equation (7) therefore becomes the pair of simultaneous relations
which Algorithm 1 applies to efficiently compute x(P ⊕ Q). If the "difference" x(P Q) is fixed, then we can normalize it to (X P : 1), thus saving one multiplication in Step 11. Note that xADD involves neither of the curve parameters A or B, so it is identical for all Montgomery curves.
Algorithm 1: xADD: differential addition on P 1
Pseudo-doubling
It remains to handle the doubling case, where Q = P. We want to compute (X [ 
Algorithm 2 uses these, and the identity 4X P Z P = (X P + Z P ) 2 − (X P − Z P ) 2 , to efficiently compute (X [2] 
The fact that the right-hand sides of (10) are symmetric under (X P : Z P ) ↔ (Z P : X P ) reflects the fact that the doubling map [2] factors through the 2-isogeny E (A,B) → E (A,B) / T ; this aspect of Montgomery's x-line arithmetic later found an echo in Doche, Icart, and Kohel's work on efficient doubling and tripling [19] .
Step 7 of Algorithm 2 is a multiplication by the constant (A + 2)/4. We emphasize that this is the only place in the x-line arithmetic where the parameter A appears. The parameter B never appears at all: x-line arithmetic is twist-agnostic. For implementations, therefore, we try to choose A such that the cost of multiplying by (A + 2)/4 is minimized (e.g., taking A such that (A + 2)/4 is particularly small). 
Comparison with general x-line arithmetic
To see how Montgomery's choice of curve model contributes to efficient x-line arithmetic, it is instructive to compare the pseudo-addition with the equivalent formulae for a general Weierstrass model
The analogues of (7) and (8) 
, respectively. In projective coordinates, these become the relatively complicated pseudo-addition formulae
and pseudo-doubling formulae
If we specialize and take f 2 = 0, leaving f 1 and f 0 free, then we are in the case of short Weierstrass models (for which the affine formulae are classical: see eg. [12, Formulary] ). This imposes no special structure on E, since every elliptic curve is isomorphic to a short Weierstrass model over F q . The resulting projective formulae were proposed for sidechannel-aware implementations by Brier and Joye [10, §4] , with pseudo-addition requiring 7M + 2S + 2c + 3a + 2s and pseudo-doubling 3M + 4S + 2c + 6a + 2s.
But we can simplify things more dramatically by taking f 0 = 0 instead, leaving f 1 and f 2 free. This is equivalent to requiring a rational 2-torsion point on E, which we move to (0, 0). The pseudo-addition formulae become
which can be evaluated in 6M + 2S + 1c + 2s, while pseudodoubling becomes
which can be evaluated in 2M + 4S + 2c + 4a + 1s. Now taking f 1 = 1 not only eliminates 1c in the pseudoaddition and pseudo-doubling, it also allows us to save 2M in the pseudo-addition and 2S in the pseudo-doubling (at the cost of a few more additions and subtractions) by exploiting the symmetry of the resulting forms. 4 Indeed, if we write A for f 2 and allow a possible quadratic twist by B, then we have arrived at Montgomery's model E : By 2 = x(x 2 + Ax + 1), and we recover the efficient pseudo-addition and pseudodoubling in (9) and (10). 
The Montgomery ladder

The ladder in a group
Algorithm 3 presents the Montgomery ladder algorithm in the context of a group, for ease of analysis. (While the algorithm is presented using a Montgomery curve E (A,B) , it is clear that it works in any abelian group).
Algorithm 3: Montgomery's binary algorithm in the group E (A,B) (F q )
Translation by the 2-torsion point (0, 0) is defined by (x, y) → ( f 1 /x, − f 1 y/x 2 ); taking f 1 = 1 is therefore equivalent to putting this translation map in the special form of (3). Algorithm 3 maintains two important invariants. First, looking at Lines 4 and 6, we see that the difference R 1 R 0 never changes; then, looking at Line 1, we see that that difference must always be P; hence, at all times,
Second, after iteration i of the loop (counting downwards from − 2), we have
This proves the correctness of Algorithm 3: At Line 7, we have just finished iteration i = 0, so we return R 0 = [(k) 0 ]P = [k]P. Equation (12) is easy to see once we know (11): Looking at R 0 in each iteration, we recover the classic double-and-add method for computing [k]P. First, (11)-that is, we double R 0 and add P.
The Montgomery ladder
Equations (11) and (12) Maintaining the notation of (12), let (x 0 , x 1 ) = (x([(k) i ]P), x([(k) i + 1]P)). Then (11) shows that we can compute (x([(k) i−1 ]P), x([(k) i−1 + 1]P)) as (xDBL(x 0 ), xADD(x 0 , x 1 , x(P))) or (xADD(x 0 , x 1 , x(P)), xDBL(x 1 )), depending on the value of the bit k i . 5 We can therefore initialize (x 0 , x 1 ) to (x(P), x([2]P)) = (x(P), xDBL(x(P))), and then applying the transitions above for each bit of k will yield (x 0 ,
While the final value of x 0 is x([k]P), the target of our calculation, we will see in Sect. 4.3 that the final value x([k + 1]P) of x 1 can be used to help recover the full group element [k]P, if desired. We therefore include x 1 as an optional second return value in Algorithm 4.
Recovery of y-coordinates
On the surface, the Montgomery ladder appears to be an algorithm for computing x([k]P) from x(P). However, López 5 Since the xADD and xDBL calls always share an argument, it is common for high-performance implementations to exploit any overlap between intermediate calculations in the xADD and xDBL by merging them in one combined function.
Algorithm 4: LADDER: The Montgomery ladder
7 return x 0 (and optionally x 1 ) and Dahab [35] observed that since it actually computes López and Dahab originally gave formulae for this recovery step specific to Montgomery curves over binary fields. Their results were extended to prime-field Montgomery curves by Okeya and Sakurai [42] , and later to short Weierstrass models by Brier and Joye [10] . Kohel provides a more general and powerful point of view in [31] , treating the image of the curve under the map Q → (x(Q), x(Q ⊕ P)) as a new model of the elliptic curve itself.
Okeya and Sakurai proceed as follows. Suppose P is not in E (A,B) [2] , and Q is not in {P, P, O}. 6 In affine coordinates, writing (x P , y P ) = P, (x Q , y Q ) = Q, and (x ⊕ , y ⊕ ) = P ⊕ Q as usual, the group law formulae in Sect. 2.2 show that y Q can be deduced from x P , y P , x Q , and x ⊕ using the relation
(note the re-appearance of the twisting parameter B). Algorithm 5, taken from [42, Algorithm 1], applies this to compute Q from P, x(Q), and x(P ⊕ Q). Lines 6 and 15 involve multiplications by the constants 2 A and 2B. Referring back to Sect. 3.3, if (A + 2)/4 is chosen to be advantageously small, then 2 A = 8((A + 2)/4) − 4 is also small. Similarly, referring back to Sect. 2.1, we can choose B such that multiplication by 2B is essentially free.
Combining Algorithms 4 and 5 yields Algorithm 6, an efficient scalar multiplication routine for the full group E (A,B) (F q ) using x-only arithmetic. This is generally much more efficient than Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 6: Scalar multiplication on E (A,B) (F q ), combining the Montgomery ladder with y-coordinate recovery
Input: k ∈ Z >0 , and P in E (A,B) (F q ) \ E (A,B) [2](F q ) Output: [k]P 1 (x 0 , x 1 ) ← LADDER(k, (X P , Z P )) where (X P : Z P ) = x(P) 2 Q ← Recover(P, x 0 , x 1 ) 3 return Q
Montgomery curves and ladders in elliptic curve cryptography
We saw in Sect. 2.3 that no Montgomery curve can have prime order, since their order is always divisible by 4. The presence of this small cofactor 4 has no serious impact on the security level of a well-chosen Montgomery curve, since the state of the art for solving discrete logarithms in large primeorder subgroups of Montgomery curves is still Pollard's rho method [43] . 
Montgomery curves in cryptographic standards
We find #E(F p ) = 4r and #E (F p ) = 4r , where r and r are 446-and 447-bit primes, respectively. , then precisely one of B and B is a square in F q , and the other is a non-square. It follows that every element x P in F q corresponds to a point P = (x P , y P ) which is either in E (A,B) [2] (F q ). Bernstein chose the curve in Example 1 by insisting that both E (A,B) (F q ) and E (A,B ) (F q ) have cryptographically strong (i.e., almost prime) group orders. This means that every element of F q corresponds to a point on a cryptographically strong Montgomery curve, and implementers need not perform any point validation checks [8] in this protocol. Moreover, since the Montgomery ladder does not use the constant B, it correctly computes (x(P), k) → x([k]P) irrespective of the twist that P lies on. If both  E (A,B) and E (A,B ) are secure, then E (A,B) is said to be twist-secure.
Diffie-Hellman with x-coordinates
As we noted above, when implementing cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problems, we generally want #E (A,B) (F q ) as close to prime as possible. We have #E (A,B) (F q ) + #E (A,B ) (F q ) = 2q + 2, as with any elliptic curve-twist pair over F q ; so if E (A,B) (F q ) = 4r with r prime, then the closest we can come to prime order for the twist is #E (A,B ) 3 (mod 4), and #E (A,B ) 1 (mod 4) . We do not know of any theoretical asymptotic results guaranteeing a density or distribution of twist-secure Montgomery curves over any finite field, but there does not seem to be any problem in finding such curves in practice. 7 The presence of non-trivial cofactors means that care must be taken in certain scenarios to thwart the threat of small subgroup attacks [34] . For x-line Diffie-Hellman, the easiest way to do this is to define all secret scalars to be a multiple of the lowest common multiple of the curve and twist cofactors.
Constant-time ladders
For secure software implementations of ECC, it is important that scalar multiplication routines exhibit uniform execution patterns with no correlation between timing and secret data; such constant-time behavior is an essential first step toward preventing timing attacks [30] . Unlike many other addition chains and scalar multiplication algorithms, the Montgomery ladder has an inherently uniform execution pattern. Nevertheless, a number of issues must still be addressed in order to achieve constant-time implementations.
As it stands, the length of the main loop in Algorithm 4 is determined by the bitlength k of the input scalar m ∈ [0, r ). There are two common strategies for making the loop length independent of k. One option is to require all scalars to have their top bit set, either by defining them that way (as was done in [3] ) or by adding a small, fixed multiple of the (sub)group order to each scalar. A second option is to modify Step 1 of Algorithm 4, setting (x 0 , x 1 ) ← (x(O), x(P)) instead of (x(P), x([2]P)). Since the formulae for xDBL and xADD behave correctly under these inputs, x 0 and x 1 will remain unchanged until the first nonzero bit of the scalar k is encountered, so a constant-length loop can be achieved by accepting scalars as all bitstrings of a fixed length.
Algorithm 4 presents the ladder using an if statement. Since each if represents branching on potentially secret data, and these branches may be measured in timing variations, it is standard practice to replace the branches with conditional swaps (such as the SWAP defined in Algorithm 7) to avoid leaking information on secret scalars. The result is Algorithm 8, which consists of a uniform sequence of xDBLs and xADDs. Provided the field arithmetic used by the xADD and xDBL specified in Algorithms 1 and 2 is implemented in a completely uniform way, this yields a completely uniform algorithm.
Algorithm 7: SWAP: Constant-time conditional swap.
Input: b ∈ {0, 1} and a pair (x 0 , x 1 ) of objects encoded as n-bit strings Output:
// bitwise and, xor; do not short-circuit and 3 return (x 0 xor v, x 1 xor v)
Algorithm 8: A uniform Montgomery ladder
Cost: − 1 calls to xADD, calls to xDBL, and − 1 calls to
Completeness and Bernstein's modified x-map
Algorithms 4 and 8 do not compute the pseudomultiplication x([k]P) correctly if P = O or T : Instead, they return (X k , Z k ) = (e, 0) for some e in F q (see [2, Theorem 4.3] for a more precise statement). In some cases, e may be 0, in which case (X k : Z k ) = (0 : 0) is not even a projective point, but even if e = 0, the resulting (X k : Z k ) = (1 : 0) may not be equal to x([k]P).
In Montgomery's original context of ECM, this is a feature, not a bug: The ultimate goal there is to produce (X k , Z k ) such that gcd(Z k , N ) > 1, regardless of whether or not (X k : Z k ) is a correct pseudomultiplication result, or even a legal projective point. But it presents a complication for x-line Diffie-Hellman, because it appears that the parties in a key exchange are obliged to carry out some zero checks to ensure that the inputs are not x(O) or x(T ).
Bernstein shows that a modest modification to the map x allows such checks to be omitted entirely [2, Theorem 5.1]. The result is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange where the inputs are not points on the x-line, but simple finite field elements, by using the mapping x 0 : E (A,B) (F q ) → F q defined by
in place of x. This means using the ladder with input (X P , Z P ) = (x, 1), where x = x 0 (P) for any P on E (A,B) or its twist-so x can be any element of F q -then returning x k = X k Z q−2 k in F q instead of (X k , Z k ). Note that x k = X k /Z k if Z k = 0, and 0 otherwise; in either case, x k = x 0 ([k]P). Bernstein's x 0 therefore provides pseudocompleteness for the ladder on Montgomery curves, and an extremely simple and efficient key exchange based on the maps x → x k .
Differential addition chains and higher-dimensional algorithms
An addition chain of length for a nonnegative integer k is an increasing sequence of nonnegative integers, (c 0 , . . . , c ) , with c 0 = 1 and c = k, satisfying the following property: For all 0 < i ≤ m, there exist j and j such that c i = c j + c j with 0 ≤ j ≤ j ≤ i. Addition chains have wide application in public key cryptography due to their correspondence with group exponentiations. In the context of elliptic curve cryptography, the existence of a length addition chain (c 0 , . . . , c ) for k implies that the scalar multiplication (k, P) → [k]P can be computed using group operations. Thus, shorter addition chains require fewer operations, and ultimately yield faster scalar multiplication routines.
To use the fast x-line arithmetic of Montgomery curves, we need a special type of addition chain. A differential addition chain of length for an integer k is a sequence (c 0 , . . . , c +1 ) with c 0 = 0, c 1 = 1, and (for our purposes) k ∈ {c , c +1 }, together with the property that for all 1 < i ≤ + 1, there exist i , j and j such that c i = c j + c j and c i = c j − c j with 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ j < i. The existence of a length-differential addition chain for k implies that the pseudomultiplication (k, x(P)) → x([k]P) can be computed using a total of differential operations (i.e., xADDs and xDBLs).
For an -bit scalar, the Montgomery ladder corresponds to a length 2 − 1 differential addition chain (c 0 , . . . , c 2 ); it requires two additions (one of which is a doubling) for each bit of the scalar except the top bit, where only one operation is required. In his search for shorter differential addition chains [39] , Montgomery proved that any -bit prime scalar requires at least 1.440 x-line operations, providing a lower bound on the number of operations required in a differential addition chain in the worst case [39, §3] . (The best-case exponents, powers of 2, require 1 operation per bit.)
Montgomery's Euclidean algorithms
The Montgomery ladder is a differential addition chain where the difference index c i is 1 throughout; this corresponds to every xADD taking the same difference x(P). While this yields a simple and uniform algorithm, allowing c i to vary can yield shorter addition chains and faster scalar multiplication.
Starting from the (subtractive) Euclidean algorithm for finding the greatest common divisor of two integers, Montgomery derived several algorithms for producing differential addition chains that were significantly shorter than his ladder. The idea is to have a coprime auxiliary exponent alongside the input k, and use the intermediate steps in the Euclidean algorithm to write down a differential addition chain for k. This process computes a differential addition chain for the auxiliary exponent as well, so these algorithms are inherently two dimensional. Here we discuss one of these algorithms, PRAC, beginning with its two-dimensional core before returning to the one-dimensional wrapper.
Algorithm 9 (EUCLID2D) is a version of Montgomery's two-dimensional PRAC subroutine using only the "binary" transformations proposed by Montgomery in [39, Table 4 ]. Given a multiscalar (m, n) and x(P), x(Q), and x(P Q), it computes x([m]P ⊕[n]Q) using only xADD and xDBL operations. This variant chain was used (for non-uniform scalar multiplications) by the implementation of endomorphismaccelerated scalar multiplications on the curve in Example 3.
Since the difference arguments to the xADDs in EUCLID2D vary, we must be careful about handling differences like x(O) and x(T ), which cause the xADD and xDBL we defined in Algorithms 1 and 2 to degenerate. For simplicity, in this section we suppose that xADD and xDBL have been extended to cover all inputs (perhaps using conditional code, which is acceptable in these non-uniform algorithms).
At first glance, EUCLID2D is much more complicated than LADDER, but it is in fact remarkably simple and elegant. Suppose we want to compute [m]P ⊕ [n]Q. Lines 1 through 12 maintain the following invariants: gcd(s 0 , s 1 ) = gcd(m, n) (the reader may recognize a subtractive Euclidean algorithm here), and (x 0 ,
Hence after the first while loop, having arrived at s 0 = 0, we must have s 1 = gcd(m, n) and x 1 = x([m/s 1 ]P ⊕ [n/s 1 ]Q). To complete the task, it suffices to carry out a one-dimensional pseudomultiplication of x 1 by s 1 = gcd(m, n) (in Line 16 we use LADDER); of course, if m and n are random, then we expect s 1 to be quite small at this point. The second while loop (Lines [13] [14] slightly optimizes this final one-dimensional pseudomultiplication by using pure pseudo-doubling to exhaust any power of 2 in s 1 , saving a few superfluous xADDs in the LADDER call.
If we had an efficient pseudo-tripling operation x(P) → Algorithm 10 is a simplified version of PRAC: We omit the repeated-tripling step that, like the ternary steps omitted in its subroutine Algorithm 9, presupposes the existence of rapid pseudo-tripling on E (A,B) . The idea of taking (m, n) = ( k/ϕ , k − k/ϕ ), where ϕ = (1 + √ 5)/2 is the famous golden ratio, is that this induces a sequence of roughly ( 1 2 log ϕ 2) of the relatively cheap so-called Fibonacci branch (Lines 5-6) of Algorithm 9, followed by roughly 1 2 branches distributed as for random multiscalars. We refer the reader to Stam's thesis [47, §3.3.4] for further details and analysis.
Higher-dimensional ladder analogues
Although the short addition chains produced by Montgomery's Euclidean algorithms are suitable for his original application to ECM, their non-uniform and variable-time behavior makes them less suitable for application to ECC, where uniformity is a mandatory first step toward hiding secret exponents from adversaries exploiting side channels. For cryptographic multiscalar multiplications, we may need higher-dimensional differential addition chains that share the uniform behavior of the one-dimensional Montgomery ladder. Bernstein defines a two-dimensional analogue of the Montgomery ladder in [4] (the "binary chain"). Given an -bit multiscalar (m, n) and the values of x(P), x(Q), x(P Q) and x(P ⊕ Q), this algorithm computes x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q) using exactly 3 differential operations. If xDBL and xADD are implemented in a uniform way, then Bernstein's algorithm is also uniform: It is a sequence of steps, each consisting of one xDBL and two xADDs. Further, in each of those steps, the argument of xDBL is shared by one of the xADDs, and in some contexts these calls may be merged to use some shared computations.
Every call to xADD in Bernstein's algorithm takes one of the four input values x(P), x(Q), x(P Q) and x(P ⊕ Q) as its difference argument; this makes it possible to recover the correct y-coordinate for the output x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q) using exactly the same technique as in Sect. 4.3. This makes Bernstein's chain a viable option for computing the multiscalar multiplication during the verification phase of signature schemes that take advantage of differential arithmetic.
Brown defined an n-dimensional analogue of the Montgomery ladder in [11] . Given an n-dimensional multiscalar (m 1 , . . . , m n ) in Z n , Brown's algorithm uses x-line arithmetic to compute x([m 1 ]P 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ [m n ]P n ) from the (3 n − 1)/2 input values x([e 1 ]P 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ [e n ]P n ) with the e i ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and not all zero.
Example 3 (A Montgomery Qcurve reduction [18]) The Montgomery curve
with A = 45116554344555875085017627593321485421+ 2415910908 √ −1 has #E(F p ) = 4r and #E (F p ) = 8r , where r and r are 252-and 251-bit primes, respectively. In [18] , we see that E is equipped with an efficiently computable endomorphism ψ of degree 2 p, which acts on [25] could be used to compute one-dimensional scalar multiplications [k]P as two-dimensional multiplications [m]P ⊕ [n](ψ(P)), with m and n of roughly 128 bits. The scalar multiplication implementation in [18] transports the GLV approach to the x-only setting, simultaneously exploiting Montgomery arithmetic. First, we compute x(P) → x(ψ(P)) and x(P) → x((ψ − 1)P) = x(ψ(P) P). Then given any k in [0, r ), we can compute x([k]P) = x([m]P ⊕ [n]ψ(P)), where m and n are 128-bit scalars, using Algorithm 9 for public scalars and Bernstein's uniform two-dimensional binary chain for private scalars.
Generalizations and other applications
The Montgomery ladder is a general algorithm that works in any abelian group, and in group quotients where analogues of xADD are available. The most interesting groups of this kind-at least from a cryptographic point of view-are other models of elliptic curves, and Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves.
The Montgomery ladder on other models of elliptic curves
The Montgomery ladder can be applied to any model of an elliptic curve, using either the usual addition and doubling operations, or the analogue of x-only arithmetic. For Weierstrass models, the chief interest in the Montgomery ladder is its side-channel resistance when computing scalar multiples with secret scalars, as explored by Brier and Joye in [10] . Gaudry and Lubicz [27] used the classical complex analytic theory of theta functions to derive pseudo-group law formulae for P 1 ∼ = E λ / , where E λ : y 2 = x(x − 1)(x − λ) is a Legendre model. Their formulae offer trade-offs with the xADD and xDBL operations on Montgomery curves, which could make them favorable in certain scenarios.
Castryck, Galbraith, and Farashahi [14] made the striking suggestion of using Montgomery curves in conjunction with their corresponding twisted Edwards models. The transformations of (4) and (5) are extremely easy to compute; this allows a mixed arithmetic, passing back-and-forth between x-only pseudo-additions on the Montgomery curve and v-only pseudo-doublings on the corresponding Edwards curve.
The Montgomery ladder on hyperelliptic curves
The Montgomery ladder has been applied with great success in hyperelliptic cryptography based on genus-2 curves. The story begins with Smart and Siksek [46] , who observed that we can use pseudo-additions to instantiate Diffie-Hellman key exchange on Kummer surfaces (quotients of Jacobians of genus-2 curves by ±1). Duquesne [20] made this concrete by combining the ladder with explicit formulae for arithmetic on genus-2 curves of the form H : y 2 = x f (x), where f is a squarefree degree-4 polynomial. While the factor of x on the right-hand side also appears in the defining equations of Montgomery curves, Duquesne's curves are not a true genus-2 Montgomery analogue: We would expect a particularly simple action on the Jacobian of the elements of the kernel of a (2, 2)-isogeny factoring [2] , for example, mirroring the special form of the translation-by-T map on Montgomery curves, but no such structure is imposed by Duquesne's form. Nevertheless, this special curve form allows a small speedup over general genus-2 arithmetic. Duquesne later described the Montgomery ladder on Kummer surfaces of arbitrary genus-2 curves [21] , building on Flynn's arithmetic of general Kummer surfaces [13, Chapter 3] .
Gaudry used the Montgomery ladder for efficient pseudomultiplication on a model of the Kummer with especially fast pseudo-addition and pseudo-doubling operations [26] , building on observations of D. V. and G. V. Chudnovsky [15] . Here, the efficiency really is a consequence of a special 2-torsion structure: All of the 2-torsion points are defined over F q , and their translations act linearly on the Kummer by diagonal and permutation matrices. This approach has successfully used in high-speed Diffie-Hellman implementations [6, 9, 44] , and a hyperelliptic generalization of ECM factorization [17] .
An analogue of y-coordinate recovery (see Sect. 4.3) exists in genus 2: Chung and the authors give an explicit algorithm in [16] , recovering Jacobian elements from the out-put of the Montgomery ladder on the Kummer. This enables the implementation of full signature schemes using Kummer surfaces [44] .
All of these ideas and techniques are carried much further in the setting of higher-dimensional abelian and Kummer varieties by Lubicz and Robert [36] .
